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ABSTRACT 
 This case addressed the issue of whether the Clean Air Act (CAA) preempts state law tort 
claims of private landowners brought in the state where emissions are occurring.  Additionally, 
the case determined whether the political question doctrine barred the complaint as a policy-
making decision constitutionally allocated to the U.S. Congress. The court decided that the 
cooperative purpose of the CAA is not frustrated when actions are brought under the law of the 
pollution’s source state, rather than the state law of affected parties. The federal regulations serve 
as a floor that state law may exceed but not lower. The court also determined that no court has 
ever held, under the political question doctrine, that the legislative branch carries constitutional 
authority to redress private property rights regarding air pollution, so the claim was 
constitutional. It was thus proper for the Bell parties to seek redress for individual tort damages 
under the CAA.  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 As a matter of first impression, in Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station,1 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held the Clean Air Act’s (“CAA”) design of cooperative 
implementation between state and federal entities2 allows private property owners to bring state 
law tort claims for pollution violations filed in the source state.3  Thus, state law claims are not 
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preempted by the federal statute, because the law employs a “cooperative federalism” structure 
that establishes a baseline of air quality standards that state law is free to exceed, but not lower.4 
Additionally, the court asked whether personal property rights claims for pollution were 
excluded from judicial review, and held that such a constitutional grant of authority for personal 
torts such as these has never been found.5 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 Plaintiffs Kristie Bell and Joan Luppe represented a putative class of 1,500 people (the 
“Class”) who lived on or owned property within one mile of the GenOn Cheswick coal-fired 
electrical generation plant (the “Plant”) in Spring Dale, Pennsylvania.6  The Class’s complaint 
alleged contaminants and ash regularly settled on their properties neighboring the plant.7  For 
these harms, the Class sought injunctive relief to require GenOn to remove the particulate plus 
compensatory and punitive damages for trespass, nuisance, negligence and recklessness under 
state law theories.8  The complaint alleged that GenOn did not utilize the required Best Available 
Technology (“BAT”) and that it knowingly implemented improper construction and operation 
methods, which allowed the particulate byproducts to cross property lines.9  
 Availing itself of diversity jurisdiction, GenOn removed the case to district court in the 
Western District of Pennsylvania, where it moved to dismiss the action, arguing the CAA 
preempted the state law tort claims.10  Further, GenOn argued that federal preemption served to 
preserve the CAA’s comprehensive scheme and allowance of state law claims would undermine 
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the statute’s purpose and goals.11  The district court granted GenOn’s motion, holding that to 
permit the state law actions would be inconsistent with the CAA.12  The Class timely appealed.13 
 The Class relied on multiple provisions of the CAA for redress. First, the citizen suit 
provision of the CAA reserves the right of citizens to file civil suits for violations of emissions 
standards.14  This right to seek enforcement under statute or common law may not be restricted 
and is called the “citizen suit savings clause.”15  Second, the “Retention of State Authority” 
clause guarantees the retention of state authority, prohibiting the preclusion of that authority by 
the CAA regarding standards and air pollutant controls if the floor of those federal standards is 
met.16  Third, the operating permits for the Plant were governed by the Pennsylvania Department 
of Environmental Protection, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Allegheny County 
Health Department.17 The Plant’s permit stated that any matter emitted from the plant may not be 
perceptible beyond the Cheswick’s property line. The permit also upheld the permittees’ 
obligation to comply with all federal, state and local regulations.18  
III.  ANALYSIS 
 The court determined the purpose of the CAA is not frustrated by actions brought under 
the law of the pollution’s source state and that state law claims are not barred under the CAA 
from review by the political question doctrine. 
A.  Preemption under the Supremacy Clause and U.S. Supreme Court Precedent 
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 The United States Supreme Court interprets the Supremacy Clause of the United States 
Constitution to mean that federal law can preempt state law to the extent that it conflicts with 
federal law (“conflict preemption”).19  The question of whether the CAA preempts state law tort 
claims brought against a source of pollution in the state is a matter of first impression for the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals.20  Although the Supreme Court has not decided this precise 
question, it ruled on a nearly identical question under the Clean Water Act’s (“CWA”) savings 
clause.21  The Court held that the CWA did not bar nuisance claims by private parties pursuant to 
the laws of the pollution’s source state.22  Additionally, the common and state statutory laws may 
require higher standards.23  These different state and federal restrictions, although carrying 
inherent tensions, do not frustrate the purpose of the CAA because “a source only is required to 
look to a single additional authority, whose rules should be relatively predictable.”24  The claims 
may not be filed in the affected states outside of the polluter’s regulation scheme.25  
 The circuit court held the savings clauses under the CAA and the CWA are “virtually 
identical,” which undermines GenOn’s argument that the savings clause of the CAA is narrower 
than the CWA.26  The Sixth and Fourth Circuit Courts have also found no meaningful distinction 
between the statutory clauses.27  With no distinction proven, the Third Circuit held the Supreme 
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Court’s analysis applied to the CAA.28  Thus, the Pennsylvania property owners’ suit brought 
under Pennsylvania law is not preempted by the federal statute.29 
 Public policy concerns also support this court’s holding.  GenOn argued to allow the suit 
would instigate a flood of claims.30  The court disagreed, reasoning the goals of the CAA would 
not be frustrated if the law of the source state does not disrupt the “regulatory partnership 
established by the permit system.”31  Secondly, the number of regulatory controls remain defined 
and limited, protecting parties from an indeterminate number of regulations.32  The “cooperative 
federalism” structure of both CWA and CAA regulations allow states to impose higher standards 
than the federal government.33  The federal laws are the floor, not the ceiling, of regulatory 
control.34   
B.  Political Question Doctrine 
 In the alternative, GenOn argued the political question doctrine bars the Class’s claims by 
excluding them from judicial review because such policy choices are constitutionally allocated to 
the legislature.35 But the circuit court rejected this argument because no such constitutional 
commitment of authority to the U.S. Congress regarding private property claims for pollution 
violations has ever been held by a U.S. court.36  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
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 This case solidifies the standing of individual property owners and class actions utilizing 
the state laws of the source of pollution to seek redress under the CAA savings clauses.  In 
addition, the circuit court upheld the analogous nature of the savings clauses of the CAA and 
CWA.  Going forward, a clear path is outlined for individual property owners to files suits, what 
the parameters of those claims are, and with whom they must be filed.  
